




Prophets are best at predicting the future – though, they tend towards the dystopic 
and the apocalyptic. The more philosophically inclined among us, when asked to 
imagine the future, create utopias secluded in the woods or contained on an island – 
in other words, by clearing away the accretions of  the past and the unseemly present. 
Everyone else tends to read the best or the worst of  the present moment and write 
it into the future – cars replaced by flying cars, cities replaced by mega cities, wars 
replaced by greater wars and so on. Such is the grasp that the present has on us – it 
is always natural, progressive, rational and just so. Historians, being neither prophets 
nor philosophers, usually have no thoughts on the future. We are busy figuring out 
what happened, why it did not happen some other way and why we should care it 
happened the way it did. But we do have a charge to unsettle whatever “truths” seem 
above reproach in our presents, to question basic assumptions of  how things appear 
now and to argue for an imagination that ponders all possible futures, not just the ones 
that seem predestined. 
My claim, as a historian, is simple: The “South Asia” we inhabit is a recent construct. 
It is a limited and restrictive political space as compared to more than a thousand years 
of  textual history and thousands more in material and cultural memory. The stories 
it currently tells are themselves limited, the imaginations it cultivates are themselves 
rigid. The geographies that seem so indelible, so permanent are mere shadows upon 
regional perspectives that are still legible movement and life patterns, in languages, in 
customs, and in cultural imaginations. Taking this longue dureé look at the Indic peninsula 
compels us to imagine varied configurations for the future sixty years, hence. I also take 
this as an opportunity to be fundamentally optimistic – that we can collectively realign 
our political memory to look at the past in new light and, hence, imagine other futures. 
Conceptions of  the Past, Realities of  the Present
We have a very limited, highly prejudiced, imagination when it comes to comprehending 
the premodern in South Asia. This is so because our evidences are often fragmentary, 
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malleable or encoded in political and social tropes that are overtly determined. But the 
fault doesn’t lie there. It lies, I would argue, in our overtly presentist vocabulary within 
which we chose to frame the past. The words we use, informed by our immediate 
past, are already encoded with incomprehensible difference – coercion, submission, 
conversion, conflict. The categories we construct are already hegemonic – “Hindu,” 
“Muslim,” “invader,” “indigenous.” We take these ahistoricized words and categories 
and proceed to give them universality that they don’t deserve even for the here and the 
now. What is produced are deeply pessimistic formulations, of  clashes and conquests, 
which suggest only intractable fault lines etched into the sites and spaces of  South Asia. 
There is a terrible conflation at work in our historiography when it reads a mosque 
destruction in 1992 or the political tension between India and Pakistan in 2005 as a 
necessarily transparent rerendering of  a temple destruction in 1024 or the military 
conflict between the Mughals and the Marathas in 1682. That past, unmoored from 
its historical specificity, overshadows the contexts of  the present. That particular past is 
used to explain, uncritically, or to justify, unambiguously, that which is left unexamined 
and unassimilated in the present. 
Such a reading of  the past is itself  historically situated. Already from the late 
eighteenth century, the British efforts to narrate a history of  India assumed “difference” 
within its inhabitants. When James Mill, in 1817, argued for a demarcation of  Indian 
pasts into Ancient/Hindu, Mohammadan and British India, he was codifying as fact 
what the East India Company was engaged in as practice. The Uprising of  1857, the 
birth of  nationalist politics in the 1880s, the splintering of  public space as Hindu or 
Muslim in the 1890s along with the partition of  Hindavi language as Urdu/Hindi 
created new representations of  the past, all charged with explaining communal 
difference to a politics which was rapidly coagulating along religious lines. The Arya 
Samaj or Anjuman Himayat-e Islam were communal answers to political problems, which 
took as granted the idea of  a unitary community. Hence, by the time Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah declared in 1940 that “ […] the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different 
religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor 
interdine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations, which are 
based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions,” he was echoing an established 
understanding of  incommensurate difference. Jinnah did see the political danger in 
ascribing difference only to the realm of  religion and hence offered a thousand year 
old history of  cultural practices as evidence of  both scriptural and practical difference. 
Yet, articulated as such, difference remained paramount – in policy, in historiography 
and in the everyday political realm. The sixty odd years since 1947 have cemented 
difference, as only shed blood can. Given such renderings, we can only imagine dystopic 
futures for 2060 – 1947 gives us 1992, which gives us 2002, which in turn gives us 2009 
and so on and so forth. The best minded among us can just hope for temperance. 
Let me briefly offer a slightly lesser acknowledged history of  the last millennium. 
However, I want to draw teleology away from the linear, progressive and ask you to 
imagine three concentric circles, each encoded with deliberately imprecise dates. 
The innermost circle, labeled 750–1250 CE, is where a specific dialogue of  political 
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theology is mostly concentrated, though it emanates outwards. The second circle, 
labeled 1220–1850 CE, is the site of  development of  a new political language, 
administrative and localized. The third circle, labeled 1480–1947 CE, is the space of  a 
distinctly visible vernacular culture, though it permeates back towards the center. The 
point of  these concentric formulations is very basic: each of  the processes I mention 
are visible (alongside other processes I do not mention) throughout this past, but at 
varied levels, and with varied emphasis. Into these contained, overlapping zones, we 
can sketch out both a history of  South Asia and a sense of  the regionalities that neither 
make difference as the raison d’être nor banish it from view. What follows is idiosyncratic 
and sketchy, so I urge the readers to seek greater details in the appended reading list.
An Alternative History
The Indian Ocean trade routes linking the coastal cities in western India to Sri Lanka 
and the East China Sea on the one end and to Yemen and the Red Sea on the other give 
us a clue to the regional foci of  the first millennium. The Greek accounts, dating back 
to the fourth and third century BCE veer between utilitarian accounts of  sea currents 
and ports to the fantastic and the marvelous descriptions of  creatures and inhabitants. 
There is not much to suggest that these merchants and sailors ever inhabited the space 
or constituted a lived community. For that, we go to the Arab geographers and their 
accounts dating from the mid-ninth century, which tell of  pivotal ports like Sarandip 
(then Ceylon, now Sri Lanka) that connected cities such as al-Mansura, Multan, Lahore, 
Aror or Indian states such as Kerala and Gujarat. In these accounts we begin to see 
how various sectarian and religious communities coexisted in mutually understandable 
political and cultural balance. I use the word “understandable” to highlight that it 
wasn’t the absence of  strife (since there were near constant battles), nor the logic of  
hegemony (the Arab accounts routinely praise “great” kings of  al-Hind) which enabled 
coexistence. Rather it was the mutual recognition of  dueling interests, balanced for 
the sake of  building communities – the Arab frontier city-states were inconsequential 
in relation to the Deccan-centered Rashtrakuta rajas or the Kanuaj-based Gurjara-
Praritharas. This is most visible in the political theology which developed in this frontier 
region – treaties with the bordering Rashtrakutas and the Gurjara-Paritharas, coinage 
with dual Arabic–Sanskrit legends (some bearing the inscription śrī madhumadī – the 
blessed Muhammad) built to Indic weight and protection for the pilgrims to the Sun 
Temple in Multan. To give a concrete example, Hudud al-Alam (Limits of  the World), 
a geography compiled in late tenth century lists Lahore as a bustling city, with almost 
no Muslim population, under an Isma’ili governor. It notes, with approval, the security 
provided by the city to the traveler and the trader but it also carefully encodes sectarian 
difference into the description. Similarly, the accounts that specify the reusage of  sacral 
space (e.g., building a mosque at the site of  a temple, a Sunni mosque at the site of  an 
Isma’ili mosque, reusing temple corpora) situate these acts as frontier practices which 
were inherently multivalued – legible as political and as religious acts, and as such, 
negotiable. The early thirteenth-century Persian Chachnama narrates several accounts 
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of  sacred sites being protected specifically for their sacral and political value after a 
dialogue with the attendants and the community.
The “Muslim” empires that followed in the eleventh and twelfth century were 
based not in Damascus or Baghdad but in Ghazna and Ghur (Afghanistan), situating 
them specifically as Indic polities – the Ashokan empire from the third millennium BC 
stretched to Kandahar, after all. Hence, they need to be contextualized in much the same 
way as the Chola dynasties in the south – belonging to a mutually intelligible political 
theology in the Indic peninsular. Evidences for such a framing are abundant. Mahmud 
of  Ghazna (d. 1030), that foremost iconoclast, employed Hindavi commanders and 
battalions. Tilak, the commander of  the Hindavi troops, first got a job as a translator 
with the Mahmud court and then rose up the ranks, eventually having his own quarter 
in the city of  Ghazna. Some accounts of  that city, as well as surviving architecture, 
reveals a multiethnic space where artisans, trades and crafts communities from the 
Sindh and Rajasthan thrived. The regional specificity of  Mahmud’s court is also 
visible in Buddhist temple paintings in Ladakh, which show the royal family clothed in 
textile patterns and style recognizable from Ghazna to Baghdad. 
As we enter the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, we can now talk directly about 
the development of  a new political language – Persian, and later Hindavi. The rapid 
rise of  the Mongol empire across central and western Asia prompted mass migrations 
to cities across southern Asia – especially where preexisting networks of  patronage 
and habitation were the strongest. These new migrants leveraged a networked globe 
where scriptural and scribal qualifications could enable someone to move across the 
cities of  India and beyond (one can use the life of  Ibn Battuta as exemplar of  such a 
network). The capacity of  the Delhi and Deccani courts to absorb such immigrants 
was possible only because of  greater and tighter integration between the throne-city 
and its environ. I am, however, not referring simply to the Persian language, but to 
an Indo–Persianate literary culture, which sustained itself  through deeply heterodox 
political communities – scribal, bureaucratic, martial, artisanal and governing. These 
knowledge brokers (munshi, vakil,`amil to name just a few categories) were just as likely to 
be Brahmin or Kathari as Sunni or Shi’a. They acted as translators of  custom, practice 
and law across the wide swaths of  bordered empires and imperial practices, making 
possible the many transitions between the political entities from the Delhi Sultanates 
in the thirteenth century to Vijayanagar to the Mughal – and the Rajput, the Maratha 
and then the Sikh, the Nizam and the British. It was also in this realm that official acts 
of  translations were conducted – in texts (of  Yoga-vasishta or Ramayana), in architecture, 
in painting, cuisine and royal clothing. 
The largest circle belongs to the vernacular culture. We can use the emergence 
of  Hindavi vernacular, from the fourteenth century forward, to best contextualize 
this realm. However this isn’t a scriptural tradition, rather one that combines orality, 
practice and daily rituals where various strands of  spiritual knowledge make new 
forms – deeply rooted in the local, from Punjab to Awadh to Deccan to Bengal. The 
clearest we can access it for the premodern is in the poetic and literary culture – the 
Hindavi riddles of  Amir Khusrau (d. 1325), Khawaja Nakhshabi’s Tuti Nama (c. 1350), 
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Maulana Daud’s Cāndayān (1379), the Padmavat of  Malik Muhammad Jayasi (d. 1542), 
the Madhumalati of  Shaikh Manjhan Shattari, the Panth of  Kabir (early sixteenth 
century), the kafiyyan of  Shah Hussain (d. 1599) and Bulleh Shah (d. 1757), the Heer of  
Waris Shah (d. 1798). The short list is merely to sketch a literary culture that translated 
sacral and mystical sentiments within communities across the vast plains of  north India 
and dipping down to the Deccan. Hence, these names and texts reflect everyday life in 
living communities (whether “Hindu” or “Muslim”) where such narratives, stories, and 
songs found daily practice and were sustenance.
These processes were never mutually exclusive nor were they sequential. One way to 
imagine them is to see the circles radiate out from the various royal cities which dotted 
the geography of  premodern India peninsular – where the political theology was most 
visible in the courts, among the nobility, the political language of  everyday governance 
tied the court to that city and others beyond via a diverse and vast bureaucratic class, and 
the vernacular cultural practices entwined the millions of  inhabitants across the regions.
Making a Community through Bollywood?
Read against this long history – of  intersectarian, interreligious politics, rooted languages, 
nested stories, entangled everyday lives – civilizational difference seems impossible to 
argue. Yet, ethnic and religious strife, whether intercommunal or intersectarian, is now 
the norm. The regional connectors such Kashmir, Kabul-Peshawar, Sri Lanka and 
Dhaka are decoupled. The centers of  power, and consequently access to development 
is cordoned off  for the vast majorities and the various demagogues from the radical 
right continue to have unfettered access to the mainstream. Except for a few restricted 
exercises (cricket), the states have been careful to keep the segregation intact. 
Clearly, the work of  the various states in demonizing the other is well documented 
through these decades (not just Hindu–Muslim but the linguistic and ethnic “Others”) 
resulting in bloodsheds across South Asia. The bloody scars of  the various partitions 
(the 1905, the 1947, the 1971) themselves constitute a radical history of  violence and 
grievances that rewrites the everyday. Clearly, the states are active agents in constituting 
the cultural landscape – either directly or indirectly. Given all that, what can we say 
about those three concentric circles, constituting nearly 1,300 years of  historical time? 
Is that world of  mutually comprehensible difference vanished, taking along with it, the 
vernacular culture?
However, I started writing this piece with an optimistic mindset. I gave you that 
long history to assert that what I hope to see is neither impossible nor improbable. 
To imagine a South Asia where cultural comprehension exists despite difference is to 
remember the life of  the Lahori munshi Chandar Bhan Brahmin (d. 1662) who was 
cherished by three successive Mughal emperors for his eloquence, his service and his 
intelligence. To imagine a South Asia with porous borders is to realize the cultural 
network of  poets and texts that stretched from Kabul to Dhaka to Sri Lanka. To 
imagine a South Asia where difference is mutually comprehensible is also to look at the 
desi diaspora around the world.
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I think that the Bombay-based Hindi film industry (Bollywood) does create a public, 
and a vernacular culture that is legible across western and southern Asia – a rarely 
discussed facet of  this global juggernaut – there is, of  course, substantial academic 
attention paid to the ways in which audiences from Egypt and Morocco to Hong Kong 
and Singapore consume Bollywood. Within South Asia, Bollywood enables the creation 
of  new cultural referents, and provides a common vocabulary; most crucially it keeps 
long-standing historical and cultural themes within living memory – the particular 
view of  love, of  jealousy, of  friendship, of  the beloved that we can easily trace to the 
vernacular epics of  the seventeenth century. Most of  this is not a surprise considering 
that from the very beginnings of  Indian cinema, the epics (from the Mahabharata to 
Laila Majnun) have been a popular source, and that the film industry has remained far 
more agnostic on the faiths of  its workers than the surrounding society.
To be precise, in arguing Bollywood’s role in sustaining a particular vernacular 
culture, I am referring largely to its aural effect – the embedding of  cultural markers 
within songs. I am less keen to argue the role of  the movies themselves – even those as 
disparate as Jodha Akhbar (2008) or Mission Kashmir (2000) – which do create the capacity 
to imagine the Other, by presenting both the syncretic and the demonic, mainly due 
to the limitation of  space. The dominance of  radio sangeet programs from the 50s, 60s 
and 70s, which popularized the vocals of  Kishore Kumar, Mohammad Rafi and Lata 
Mangeshkar with the words of  Majrooh Sultanpuri and Sahir Ludhianvi, to this day in 
secondary and tertiary markets across South Asia is no accident. There is a wonderful 
sequence in Kabir Khan’s Kabul Express (2006) where the Indian, Pakistani and Afghan 
characters (journalists, army officers and suspected terrorist) break out into a Sahir 
Ludhianvi song from the 1962 film Hum Dono. This modern rendition of  a verse 
creating a community of  listeners is not too far removed from one that informed the 
listeners of  Heer Ranjha of  Waris Shah. A more recent phenomenon is the surprising 
popularity of  the Coke Studio Music Sessions in Pakistan, that pairs folk songs and singers 
with more contemporary arrangements – the intense emotive capacity displayed by 
the Pakistani audiences enraptured in Balochi or Seraiki or Punjabi lyrics echoes my 
sense of  “making a community/” The purpose was mainly to give bathos to the idea 
of  the Other – the capacity and the possibility to imagine, and to know. 
It is the viewer/listener’s engagement with the motifs, the sounds, the looks, the 
dialogues, the lyrics of  Bollywood that writes a very different type of  narrative. It 
creates an everyday poetics and disseminates it across a broadly varied ethnolinguistic 
terrain. So, to imagine that group from Kabul Express singing Sahir Ludhianvi’s lyrics 
(through Dev Anand, of  course) is to recognize that there already exists a cultural space 
where such a translation can happen effortlessly. This is, then, the most significant 
point – that despite the political and religious jaggedness, the cultural terrain of  South 
Asia remains broadly ecumenical and diverse.
Asserting comprehensible difference does not mean negating difference or 
reverting to some Nehruvian secularity or some Ayubian militarized communalism. 
Neither does it mean to ignore the internal contradictions and inequities of  each polity 
in South Asia. Further, an argument for the role of  Bollywood poetics in sustaining 
52 SOUTH ASIA 2060
a conversation does not reduce the complexity of  Bollywood itself  – a commercial 
product appealing to the broadest possible demographic at the lowest common 
denominator. Those readings remain valid. I am positing a narrower, third reading 
that focuses primarily on the role of  the song as it combines the various genres, inhabits 
various linguistic registers, yet “speaks” in a cultural vernacular that continues to hold 
valence. It is this capacity that allows us to connect not only the past, but also the many 
implicated presents – e.g., the role of  AM and FM radio, especially Radio Ceylon, All 
India Radio and Radio Pakistan in constituting this shared listenership. Similar is the 
case of  cultural blogs, YouTube and Twitter in maintaining an audience, a repository 
of  cultural memories. 
Present as Future?
I am reminded of  the late Kashmiri poet Agha Shahid Ali’s poem, “Farewell”:
At a certain point I lost track of  you.
You needed me. You needed to perfect me.
In your absence you polished me into the Enemy.
Your history gets in the way of  my memory.
I am everything you lost. You can’t forgive me.
I am everything you lost. Your perfect Enemy.
Your memory gets in the way of  my memory.
(Ali 1998)
Cultural memory is not a salvation, and culture, however defined, is not a project. Yet, 
imagining our Other as a sympathetic interlocutor, against the immediate political and 
social past is a necessary act of  disruption. Owning up to a history that undermines the 
rigidities of  the presence is a shared responsibility. The long past of  South Asia offers 
concrete ways of  imagining mutually comprehendible difference, and the specificities 
of  regional polities and economies demonstrates interconnectedness. That it once was 
doesn’t mean that it will be – it simply shows that what is is only one possible future 
among many.
Section II
STATE RELATIONS
